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THE STRATEGIC PERILS OF DELAYED DIFFERENTIATION
KRISHNAN S. ANAND AND KARAN GIROTRA
Abstract. The value of delayed differentiation (aka postponement) for a monopolist
has been extensively studied in the Operations literature. We analyze the case
of (imperfectly) competitive markets with demand uncertainty, wherein the choice
of supply chain configuration (early/delayed differentiation) is endogenous to the
competing firms. We characterize firms’ choices in equilibrium and analyze the
effects of these choices on quantities sold, profits, consumer surplus and welfare.
We demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not identified previously in the
literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation. In the
face of either entry threats or competition, these strategic effects can significantly
diminish the value of delayed differentiation. In fact, under plausible conditions,
these effects dominate the traditional risk-pooling benefits associated with delayed
differentiation, in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms,
even under cost parity with delayed differentiation. We extend the main model to
study the effects of alternate market structures, asymmetric markets and inventory
holdback. Our results, in particular that for a broad range of parameter values
early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed
differentiation, are robust to these relaxations.
Forthcoming in Management Science
1. Introduction
‘Companies must be flexible to respond rapidly to competitive and market changes.’
- Michael Porter (1996)
Contemporary businesses face uncertainty due to a variety of factors, such as increasing global-
ization, proliferation in product varieties, disruptive changes in technology, and most importantly,
uncertain demands from customers. In this context, approaches to incorporate operational flexibility
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Gerard Cachon, Xianjun Geng, Martin Lariviere, Serguei Netessine,
Erica Plambeck, Dennis Yao, the associate editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments that have
significantly improved this paper. Author names appear in alphabetical order.
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in a firm’s supply chain, to better match supply and demand, have received considerable attention.
One such approach is delayed differentiation or postponement. Using delayed differentiation, a firm
delays or postpones the final customization of a related bundle of products (and/or shipment of
product to different geographical markets) to the extent possible, pending more accurate product
and market-specific demand information. This is a form of ‘risk pooling’ across markets.
Delayed differentiation is well illustrated by the celebrated example of Hewlett-Packard (HP) (cf
Lee et al. (1993)). HP manufactured its Deskjet-Plus printers in its Vancouver, Washington facility,
and shipped the printers to three distribution centers in North America, Europe and Asia. The
transit time by sea, to the two non-U.S. distribution centers, was about a month. Depending on
the eventual destination country, different power supply modules had to be installed in the printers
to accommodate local voltage, frequency and plug conventions. The manuals and labels also had to
be localized due to language differences. HP redesigned the printer so that the power module could
be added as a simple plug-in, manufactured a generic Deskjet-Plus printer in the U.S. (sans power
supply module, manual and labels) and later localized the generic product in Europe, based on
observed demand conditions. Restructuring its printer production process in this fashion enabled
HP to maintain the same service levels with an 18% reduction in inventory, saving millions of dollars
(Lee et al. (1993)). A recent survey across a number of industries including aerospace, automotive,
education, health care, retail, high-tech and telecommunications found that 9% of firms, employed
some form of postponement (Mathews and Syed (2004)).
The main model in this paper builds on Anand and Mendelson (1998) and extends their research to
a competitive setting. In Anand and Mendelson (1998), a monopoly firm’s supply chain consists of
a production facility, a distribution center and two differentiated markets. Demand information is
used to mitigate the effects of uncertainty in the output markets. They compare a firm’s performance
under two alternative supply chain configurations– early and delayed differentiation, to quantify the
value of postponement. They compute the optimal shipping and production policies in a dynamic
(multi-period) setting, and study the drivers of the value of postponement.
In the current study, we model delayed differentiation as a decision variable in a competitive sce-
nario. Each firm in our duopoly model chooses between two different supply chain configurations-
delayed differentiation and early differentiation. We derive the equilibrium choices of supply chain
configurations, and analyze the corresponding sales, production, consumer surplus, welfare and prof-
its for each firm. While the conventional risk pooling benefits of the monopoly models persist in our
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setup, additionally, we identify strategic consequences of the supply chain configuration employed.
We show that for a wide variety of demand parameters, firms may prefer to deploy early rather than
delayed differentiation even under cost parity between the two options. Further, under plausible
conditions, we find a dominant strategy equilibrium in early differentiation, i.e., each firm’s domi-
nant strategy (independent of the other firm’s choice) is to employ early differentiation. We observe
this even when all cost and demand parameters are identical under early and delayed differentia-
tion. To understand the drivers of these results, we parse the profits of each firm into two additively
separable components. The first is the risk-pooling premium that favors delayed differentiation and
drives the results in a monopoly setting. It is a function of the demand variances and coefficients of
correlation across the different markets. We term the second component, unique to our competitive
setting, the strategic premium. This component is a function only of the size of the market in which
the two firms compete, and is higher under early differentiation. As the demand variances fall, the
correlations between a firm’s markets increase, or the size of the competitive market increases, the
strategic premium begins to dominate the risk premium, leading to the results discussed above.
We extend the analysis to a variety of relaxations of the original model, including heterogeneous
markets and retailers (Section 6) and alternative market structures (Section 7), and find that our
results are consistent. A unilateral increase in the mean demand of the competitive market (keeping
everything else constant) favors early differentiation, while such an increase in the size of any of the
monopoly markets has no impact on either firm’s choice of supply chain configuration– the absolute
profits under early or delayed differentiation obviously change but their relative ordering does not.
Thus, the degree of competition (the relative size of the competitive and monopolistic markets) is
an important determinant of the optimal supply chain configuration. Similarly, the impact of a
change in the demand correlation between a firm’s markets is unambiguous: A unilateral decrease
in this correlation increases the risk pooling premium and favors delayed differentiation for the firm,
irrespective of the other firm’s supply chain configuration. It is important to emphasize that, in
our models, the relative disadvantage of delayed differentiation with respect to early differentiation
does not arise out of different process costs, but purely due to endogenous strategic effects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, and Section
3 describes our modeling framework. Section 4 derives and compares the equilibrium production,
sales and profits under each possible supply chain configuration. In Section 5, we characterize
the equilibrium choices in supply chain configurations. In Section 6, we relax the assumption of
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identical distribution of market demands and further extend the model and analysis by allowing for
completely general distributions of demand. Next, we examine the implications of the clearance and
market structure assumptions of the main model of Sections 3-5, by relaxing these assumptions in
analytical models (in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 respectively). We demonstrate that our central message–
that early differentiation is often the dominant strategy for firms under competition, on account of
the strategic premium, and that the choice of supply chain configuration must take the industry
structure into account– is robust to all the relaxations analyzed in Sections 6 and 7. Concluding
remarks are in Section 8.
2. Related Literature
In addition to the studies of Hewlett-Packard’s use of postponement by Lee and collaborators, there
is an extensive stream of research in Operations on postponement under monopoly settings. The
interested reader is referred to the comprehensive reviews of this literature in Anand and Mendelson
(1998) and Swaminathan and Lee (2003). A second stream of research, mostly in Economics, on
early-mover commitment also relates to our competitive setting.
Military lore is replete with stories of generals gaining commitment for battle from their troops by
cutting off their retreat options– by burning the transport ships or bridges they used to reach enemy
lines (from which the idiom ‘burning one’s bridges’ derives) or by ‘nailing one’s colors to the mast’ in
Naval warfare. Troops must then win or die. Schelling (1960) provides other examples; his citation
for the 2005 Nobel memorial prize in Economics read, in part, ‘Schelling showed that a party can
strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options...’ . Similarly, under competition, a
player who commits first to a course of action or (equivalently) restricts his own options in a manner
convincing to his opponents may gain a strategic advantage, as in Stackelberg (1934). Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) and Rabah (1995) show that the signs of the slopes of the best-response functions
drive players’ preferences for the order of moves in a game: each player prefers his simultaneous
Nash payoff to his Stackelberg follower payoff if and only if the best-response curves are downward-
sloping. Stackelberg (1934)’s equilibrium arises in multistage production games in Saloner (1987),
Pal (1991) and Maggi (1996). Capital investments can play a similar role. A player might invest
in capacity to gain a strategic advantage in the subsequent Cournot (quantity-setting) competition
(Dixit (1980); Spence (1977)) or second-stage price competition (Allen et al. (1995)). Vives (2000)
provides a good overview of this literature.
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The literature on dedicated versus flexible manufacturing technologies under competition is of par-
ticular interest from an Operations perspective (Roller and Tombak (1993); Boyer and Moreaux
(1997); Goyal and Netessine (2003)). The main finding is that employing dedicated production
technology can have commitment value under competition. Roller and Tombak (1993) analyze a
two stage game, in which firms chose between a flexible and a less flexible technology in the first
stage and decide on production quantities in the second stage. In equilibrium, adoption of flexible
technologies is more likely in concentrated markets. Boyer and Moreaux (1997) extend the analysis
to consider the effect of volatility and market size on the choice of production technology. Goyal
and Netessine (2003) formally prove the existence and the uniqueness of an equilibrium in the stage
games under general conditions, and characterize the restrictions that lead to specific equilibrium
outcomes.
In our study, the trade-off between commitment and flexibility arises out of choosing the point of
differentiation of an intermediate good into related end-products. Our results demonstrate that
the rich literature on delayed differentiation arguing its superiority over early differentiation under
cost-minimization or profit-maximization was predicated very strongly on the monopoly assump-
tion. Under competition, the strategic premium plays a pivotal role, leading to early differentiation
as a dominant strategy under a broad range of parameters, even under cost parity with delayed
differentiation. Our paper demonstrates the vital importance of the link between Operations and
Industry Structure. In optimizing its Operations, it is imperative for a firm to take its Industry
Structure into account.
3. Model Setting
Competitive Structure. Two competing firms seek to maximize their individual expected profits
under demand uncertainty. Each firm sells two related products; for concreteness, we will assume
that each product is sold in a distinct product market. Each firm is the monopoly supplier in one
of its two markets, which we call the monopoly market (denoted by the superscript M). The two
firms compete in their other market (the competitive market, denoted by the superscript C).1
The model reflects a common situation wherein a firm is a strong player– a near-monopolist– in one
market (say, its home market), and faces strong competition from local players in overseas markets.
1Section 7.2 shows that our central results and intuitions hold under an alternative structure, in which the firms
compete in two markets without access to captive monopoly markets.
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For example, in the case of inkjet printers (discussed above), Hewlett-Packard was a dominant
player in the U.S., a competitive force in Europe, and a marginal presence in Japan, due to strong
competition from companies like Epson.2
Market Model. Following Anand and Mendelson (1998)’s monopoly model, each market faces a
linear and downward-sloping demand curve p (q) = a − q,3 where the intercept a is random, and
drawn from a distribution with mean a¯ and variance aˆ.4 We assume that this distribution has
compact support over the interval [al, ah], where al, ah ≥ 0 and ah − al ≤ 1.2a¯.5 Demand is
correlated between the competitive market and each monopoly market, with a correlation coefficient
ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. We build on the Cournot (quantity-setting) model of imperfect competition. In the
conventional Cournot setting, firms decide on quantities to be released into the market, and prices
adjust to clear the total quantity. However, many other settings have been found to be isomorphic to
Cournot, leading to various alternative, reasonable and appealing interpretations of this competitive
model (cf. Tirole (1988)). Notable among these isomorphic reinterpretations is price-competition
among firms with differentiated but partially substitutable products.
Supply Chain Configurations. As in Anand and Mendelson (1998), each firm’s supply chain consists
of a production facility, a distribution center (DC) and two retail outlets– one for each market.
There are two stages in the firm’s supply chain activities: in the first (production) stage, the firm
decides on production quantities and ships these to the DC. In the second (distribution) stage,
the firm allocates these quantities to its outlets. In the production stage, the firm estimates the
demand for its products using the prior distributions discussed above. In the distribution stage, the
firm observes the demand realizations; hence subsequent decisions (allocation to the two outlets)
are based on perfect demand information. This two-stage supply chain structure, wherein the
uncertainty is resolved in the second stage, is a reasonably accurate model for products with long
2In the period 1993-2003, HP consistently commanded larger than 55% share of the US inkjet market. In 2003, the
next player had less than 20% market share (source: HP Press Release, July 1, 2003.)
3The linear downward-sloping demand curve has an appealing interpretation as the demand arising from the utility-
maximizing behavior of consumers with quadratic, additively separable utility functions (Singh and Vives (1984)).
4Section 6 extends the analysis to asymmetric (ex ante heterogeneous) demand distributions across markets.
5We need to impose this restriction on the maximum spread of demand relative to the mean, to ensure that firms
have an incentive to sell positive quantities of their products in all markets (post-demand realization). Absent this
assumption, the trivial case can arise wherein a firm completely withdraws from one market and operates only in one
of the two markets. Chod and Rudi (2005) numerically evaluate the impact of such a restriction under monopoly.
They find that for typical values, the difference in the profits with and without this assumption is less than 3%.
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(a) Early Differentiation (b) Delayed Differentiation
Figure 1. Alternate Supply Chain Configurations for a Monopoly Firm
production lead-times relative to the selling cycle, such as fashion goods (cf. Fisher et al. (1994)),
in which much of the uncertainty is resolved based on early season sales or orders.
The firms may employ one of two alternative supply chain configurations:6 early differentiation
( e) or delayed differentiation (d). For a firm employing early differentiation, (Figure 1 (a)),
the products are differentiated in the production stage. Thus the DC receives intermediate goods
specialized for each product market. In the second stage, the firm then ships these goods from the
DC to the appropriate market.
Under delayed differentiation (Figure 1 (b)), the intermediate good is common to both products.
Thus, at the production stage, the firm has to decide only on the total production quantity of the
common intermediate good. In the distribution stage, after observing the realizations of demand,
each unit of the common intermediate good is customized at the DC and shipped to the appropriate
market.
Typically, adoption of delayed differentiation entails higher costs arising out of the need for reconfig-
uration of the organizational processes, process and component standardization, design modulariza-
tion (Schwarz (1989)) and longer lead-times (Lee and Tang (1999)). To isolate the strategic issues
related to the choice of supply chain configuration (which is the focus of our paper), we assume
that all production and process costs for early and delayed differentiation are identical. At the very
least, this gives us an upper bound on the benefits from postponement. Without loss of generality,
we normalize these costs to zero.
In the interest of analytical tractability, we assume for now that firms follow a clearance strategy–
After demand is realized, the firm must allocate all available stock at the distribution center to
6In the game-theory literature, the term ‘strategy’ denotes each player’s ‘contingent actions’ in response to other
players’ actions. In our multistage game, contingent actions include not only the choice of early or delayed differen-
tiation, but also production and shipment quantities for each market. Thus, we will use the term ‘strategy’ broadly
to denote all three elements of the choice, and the term ‘supply chain configuration’ to more narrowly denote one
element of a firm’s strategy– the choice of early or delayed differentiation.
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Figure 2. The Time-line
either of the markets.7 Similar assumptions have been made by Goyal and Netessine (2003), Chod
and Rudi (2005) and Deneckere et al. (1997). Chod and Rudi (2005) show that, under monopoly,
the qualitative results derived under the clearance assumption hold even when the assumption is
relaxed. In practice, many firms find it hard to change production levels in the short run owing
to long term contracts with labor unions and suppliers. For example, several car makers often
slash prices to maintain production levels, rather than keeping capacities idle– in effect following a
clearance strategy (Mackintosh (2003)).
Sequence of Events. The sequence of events is provided in Figure 2. In stage 0, the firms choose
a supply chain configuration (e or d). Then in the production stage (stage 1), the firms produce
the intermediate good(s) and ship these to their respective DCs. After production commitments
have been made, accurate demand information becomes available. In the distribution stage (stage
2), the DCs decide on the allocation of the intermediate good to each of their markets, based on
the demand information. We assume that at each stage, firms’ decisions in the preceding stages are
common knowledge.
In the production stage, a firm choosing an early differentiation configuration produces and ships
differentiated quantities qCe|. and q
M
e|. to the distribution center.
8 On the other hand, a firm employing
7We will relax this assumption in the analysis of Section 7.1.
8We use the notation ‘x|y’ (or, x given y) to refer to a firm with supply chain configuration x facing a competitor
with supply chain configuration y, where x and y can each be set to e or d. The superscripts ‘C ’ and ‘M ’ denote
the Competitive and M onopoly markets respectively. qAx|y denotes the quantity sold by a firm employing x, facing a
competitor employing y, to market A; where x, y ∈ {e, d}, A ∈ {C,M}. Qx|y denotes the quantity of intermediate
good produced by a firm employing x, facing a competitor employing y; where x, y ∈ {e, d}. Similarly, the profits
earned by a firm employing x facing a competitor that employs y are denoted by the Greek letter Πx|y. We index
particular industry structures by ‘x − y’. The consumer surplus under the industry structure x − y is denoted by
CSx−y.
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Figure 3. Alternate Supply Chain Configurations under Competition- The d-e Case
delayed differentiation produces and ships a quantity Qd|. of the common intermediate good to the
distribution center.
In the distribution stage, a firm employing delayed differentiation can allocate its common interme-
diate good Qd|. to its two markets optimally, based on the realized market demands, whereas an
early differentiator is a priori committed to the quantities allocated to each of its markets. A firm
employing delayed differentiation sells quantities qCd|.
(
aC , aM
)
and qMd|.
(
aC , aM
)
in its competitive
and monopoly markets respectively, where aC and aM are the observed realizations of the demand
intercepts. An early differentiating firm on the other hand sells its pre-committed quantities, qCe|.
and qMe|. in the two markets. The clearance strategy implies q
C
.|.
(
aC , aM
)
+ qM.|.
(
aC , aM
)
= Q.|..
The choices supply chain configuration choices can lead to three different industry structures– (i)
e-e, when both firms employ early differentiation (ii) d-e (or equivalently, e-d), when one firm
employs early differentiation and the other employs delayed differentiation , and lastly (iii) d-d,
when both firms choose delayed differentiation. We illustrate the second case- d-e in Figure 3.
4. Analysis of Supply Chain Configurations
In this Section, we derive and compare the equilibrium sales and production quantities under the
different supply chain configurations. We analyze the drivers of our results, and study their impli-
cations for firm and industry profits, consumer surplus and welfare.
4.1. Equilibria under different Supply Chain Configurations. The expected sales for a tra-
ditional monopoly and a Cournot duopoly, under our demand assumptions, are useful benchmarks.
Such a profit-maximizing monopolist sells M = a¯/2 units, and a Cournot duopolist sells C = a¯/3
in equilibrium, where a¯ (recall) is the mean of the demand intercept. In Table 1, we provide each
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Setting E
[
qM.|.
]
E
[
qC.|.
]
Competitive Mar-
ket Share
(firm 1/firm 2)
Production ,
Q.|.
d|e a¯2 = 0.5a¯
3
10 a¯ = 0.3a¯ 42%/58%
4
5 a¯ = 0.8a¯
e|e a¯2 = 0.5a¯
1
3 a¯ = 0.33a¯ 50%/50%
5
6 a¯ = 0.83a¯
d|d 4586 a¯ = 0.52¯a
30
86 a¯ = 0.35a¯ 50%/50%
75
86 a¯ = 0.87a¯
e|d a¯2 = 0.5a¯
2
5 a¯ = 0.4a¯ 58%/42%
9
10 a¯ = 0.9a¯
Monopoly Benchmark, M = a¯2 = 0.5a¯, Cournot Benchmark, C =
a¯
3 = 0.33a¯, Production
Benchmark, C +M = 56 a¯ = 0.83a¯
a¯- mean of the intercept distribution
Table 1. Expected quantities sold and produced firms in equilibrium under the
different supply chain configurations
firm’s expected sales in each market and its production, and firms’ market shares in the competitive
market. Theorem 4.1, derived from Table 1, compares the expected sales and production quantities
under the different supply chain configurations.9
Theorem 4.1. Sales and Production in Equilibrium
(1) Expected Sales: Each firm’s expected sales quantities in equilibrium under the different
supply chain configurations are related as:
E
[
qCd|e
]
< E
[
qCe|e
]
= C < E
[
qCd|d
]
< E
[
qCe|d
]
, in the competitive market;
E
[
qMd|e
]
= E
[
qMe|e
]
= E
[
qMe|d
]
= M < E
[
qMd|d
]
, in the monopoly market.
(2) Production:
(a) Firms’ production quantities in equilibrium are related as: Qd|e < Qe|e = (C +M) <
Qd|d < Qe|d.
(b) Total production (across both firms) under the different supply chain configurations are
related as: 2(C +M) = QTotee < QTotde < Q
Tot
dd , where Q
Tot
ee = 2Qe|e, QTotde = Qd|e +Qe|d
and QTotdd = 2Qd|d.
We discuss the intuition behind these results for each setting below.
9Proofs for all results are available in the Online Supplement.
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(i) The e-e supply chain configuration: Under e-e, both firms produce differentiated products at the
production stage. Thus, the decisions on production quantities for the competitive and monopoly
markets are separable and independent. The sales quantities in equilibrium correspond to Cournot
duopoly in the competitive market
(
E
[
qCe|e
]
= C = a¯/3
)
, and to traditional monopoly in the other
market
(
E
[
qMe|e
]
= M = a¯/2
)
. Thus, each firm’s production quantity Qe|e = (C +M).
(ii) The d-e (or e-d) supply chain configuration: Table 1 shows that the delayed differentiating firm
loses market share to the early differentiator in the competitive market
(
E
[
qCd|e
]
= 3a¯/10 < C = a¯/3
< E
[
qCe|d
]
= 4a¯/10
)
. In the production stage, the early differentiating firm can commit to sales in
each market; the delayed differentiator on the other hand, commits only to a quantity of the com-
mon intermediate good. Furthermore, in the shipment stage, the delayed differentiator can allocate
its production (of the intermediate good) to either the monopoly market or the competitive market,
whereas the early differentiator is unable to do so, due to its commitment to each market arising
from its supply chain configuration. Knowing this, the early differentiating firm can credibly commit
in the production stage to supplying a higher quantity (more than the Cournot quantity C = a¯/3) to
the competitive market. Given this commitment by the early differentiating firm, and the strategic
substitutability (decreasing best response functions) of each firm’s production quantity, the delayed
differentiating firm has no choice but to ship less than the Cournot quantity to the competitive mar-
ket, thus giving up market share to the early differentiator. The delayed differentiator’s response
in turn makes it an equilibrium strategy for the early differentiator to ‘oversupply’ the competitive
market: Thus, E
[
qCd|e
]
< C = a¯/3 < E
[
qCe|d
]
. Further analysis shows that for each extra unit
that the early differentiator oversupplies (above the Cournot quantity), the delayed differentiating
firm cuts back its supply by only half a unit. Consequently, for each such oversupplied unit, the
total quantity shipped to the competitive market increases by half a unit, thus decreasing the price.
Lower prices lead to diminishing marginal returns from oversupply for the early differentiator, re-
straining it from forcing the delayed differentiator entirely out of the competitive market. As seen
in Table 1, the early differentiator supplies a¯/15 units more than the Cournot quantity and the
delayed differentiator supplies a¯/30 units below the Cournot quantity to the competitive market, in
equilibrium.
The d|e firm cannot recoup these losses in the competitive market via additional sales in its monopoly
market, since it will lose revenues and profits if it supplies more than M = a¯/2 to the monopoly
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market. Thus, anticipating the early differentiator’s oversupply to the competitive market and its
own sub-Cournot response, the d|e firm cuts back its total production of the intermediate good
such that its average shipment quantity to the monopoly market is E
[
qMd|e
]
= M. For the e|· firm,
production decisions for the monopoly market are separable and independent of the decisions for
the competitive market, irrespective of the competitor’s choices. Thus, in the monopoly market
E
[
qMe|·
]
= qMe|· = a¯/2 . Each firm’s total production quantity mirrors the above intuition: Qd|e <
Qe|e = (C +M) < Qe|d. However, under d-e, the total industry production is greater than that
under e-e
(
QTotde = Qd|e +Qe|d > Q
Tot
ee
)
, reflecting the above discussion on the slopes of the reaction
functions for the d and e firms in the competitive market.
(iii) The d-d supply chain configuration: As before, decreasing best-response production functions
imply that if a firm lowers its production, its competitor will increase its production, potentially
leading to reduced profits for the first firm. Thus, both firms seek to credibly commit to their supply
to the competitive market. However, compared to early differentiation, the ability to allocate the
intermediate good to either the monopoly or the competitive market reduces the commitment
potency of each extra unit produced under delayed differentiation. Hence each firm under d-d must
increase their production to levels exceeding those under e-e to gain an equivalent level of credible
commitment. The increased production is detrimental to both firms; nevertheless, in equilibrium,
they end up supplying more than even the Monopoly and Cournot quantities to the monopoly
and competitive markets– their expected marginal revenues are negative even in their monopoly
markets
(
Qd|d =
(
E
[
qCd|d
]
+E
[
qMd|d
])
> (C +M) = Qe|e
)
. The total industry production QTotdd is
also greater than in the other supply chain configurations.
To summarize, the analysis of early versus delayed differentiation under competition is fundamen-
tally different from that under monopoly due to an important additional factor irrelevant for mo-
nopoly, viz., each firm’s ability to make credible supply commitments (reflected in both sales and
production quantities) to the competitive market. We now analyze the impact of competition on
firms’ profits, consumer surplus and welfare.
4.2. Profits, Consumer Surplus and Welfare.
(i) Profits: Firms’ expected profits, shown in Table 2, are determined by two additively separable
factors- (i) the benefits arising out of efficient allocation under uncertainty (risk-pooling premium)
and (ii) the benefits of strategic commitment (the strategic premium). The risk-pooling premium
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Setting Strategic Premium Risk PoolingPremium
Total Expected Profit
e|e 13
36 a¯
2 = 0.3611a¯2 0 1336 a¯
2
d|e 17
50 a¯
2 = 0.34a¯2 aˆ4 (1− ρ) 1750 a¯2 + aˆ4 (1− ρ)
e|d 37
100 a¯
2 = 0.37a¯2 0 37100 a¯
2
d|d 2625
7396 a¯
2 = 0.3549a¯2 4aˆ25 (1− ρ) 26257396 a¯2 + 4aˆ25 (1− ρ)
a¯- mean of the intercept distribution, aˆ- variance of the intercept distribution.
Table 2. Profits Earned
measures the benefit of risk-pooling; it includes those terms in the profit expressions that are a
function of the variance of demand, and is realized only by firms employing delayed differentiation.
The strategic premium is a function of the scale of demand (measured by the mean of the intercept
a¯), and is a relevant factor only in a competitive environment, in which its magnitude varies across
the different supply chain configurations. It is highest for a firm when it can commit to a market and
its competitor cannot (the e|d case) and lowest in the reverse situation (d|e) when the firm cannot
commit but the competitor can. When both firms have equal commitment, the strategic premium
is higher when both choose e rather than d. Note that the risk-pooling premium is increasing in
the variance aˆ and decreasing in the coefficient of correlation ρ. When risk-diversification is not
possible (when ρ = 1 in our model) or necessary (aˆ = 0), the risk-pooling premium vanishes, and
the profits are driven solely by the strategic premium.
Table 2 shows that the strategic premium is always higher for early differentiation than for delayed
differentiation for any configuration that the rival firm employs (Compare the strategic premi-
ums for e|e
(
0.3611a¯2
)
versus d|e
(
0.34a¯2
)
, and similarly for e|d
(
0.37a¯2
)
versus d|d
(
0.3549a¯2
)
).
Additionally, the strategic premium of an early differentiating firm when the competitor follows
delayed differentiation is 0.37a¯2, which is better than when the competitor is an early differentiator(
0.3611a¯2
)
. Thus, on all counts, early differentiation dominates delayed differentiation from a strate-
gic perspective. However, this dominance is tempered by the fact that only delayed differentiating
firms earn a risk pooling premium.
It is interesting to compare the relative magnitudes of the risk-pooling premiums from Table 2.
Under d-d, the risk-pooling benefits are shared by both firms, whereas under d-e, the d firm captures
all the risk-pooling benefits. Hence, the risk-pooling premium earned by a delayed differentiator is
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ρ ∈ [−1, ρ4) [ρ4, ρ3) [ρ3, ρ2) [ρ2, ρ1) [ρ1, ρ0) [ρ0, 1]
Profits
Earned
Πd|e >
Πd|d >
Πe|d >
Πe|e
Πd|d ≥
Πd|e >
Πe|d >
Πe|e
Πd|d >
Πe|d ≥
Πd|e >
Πe|e
Πe|d ≥
Πd|d >
Πd|e >
Πe|e
Πe|d >
Πd|d >
Πe|e ≥
Πd|e
Πe|d >
Πe|e ≥
Πd|d >
Πd|e
ρi = max {−1, ρ′i}, where ρ′4 = 1− 2759

1
129γ
2
, ρ′3 = 1− 3

1
5γ
2
, ρ′2 = 1− 697

1
86γ
2
, ρ′1 = 1− 19

1
15γ
2
,
ρ′0 = 1− 2575

1
258γ
2
; −1 ≤ ρ4 ≤ ρ3 ≤ ρ2 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ0 < 1; γ =
√
aˆ
a¯
- coefficient of variation of the intercept
distribution.
Table 3. Profit Comparisons
higher when the competitor does not follow delayed differentiation. Note, however, that the total
risk pooling benefit (across both firms) in d-d are higher than those under d-e.
Thus, profit comparisons across the different configurations are driven by the relative magnitudes
of the risk-pooling and strategic premiums, which are in turn determined by the values of ρ, aˆ and
a¯. Table 3 provides a complete ranking of firms’ total profits as a function of the correlation ρ and
the coefficient of variation γ =
√
aˆ/a¯. Moving left to right in Table 3, the correlation ρ increases,
reducing the risk-pooling premium and thus favoring e over d (since the strategic premium is
independent of ρ). This is reflected in the rank-ordering of profits under the different supply chain
configurations. However, in the entire range, Πe|d > Πe|e since an e firm earns a higher strategic
premium when the competitor is d rather than e, and earns zero risk-pooling premium irrespective
of the competitor’s choice.
(ii) Consumer Surplus and Welfare: Table 4 shows the industry profits, consumer surplus and
welfare under the different supply chain configurations, where welfare is the sum of industry profits
and the consumer surplus. Predictably, the ranking of industry profits (total profits across the
individual firms) is ambiguous, and depends on the relative magnitudes of the risk-pooling and
strategic premiums (determined by ρ, aˆ and a¯). Theorem 4.2 provides the ranking of consumer
surpluses and welfare.
Theorem 4.2. Consumer Surplus and Welfare: The expected Consumer Surpluses under the
different supply chain configurations follow the ranking: CSe−e < CSd−e < CSd−d. The welfare
ranking is identical to that of the Consumer Surplus.
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Setting Industry profits Consumer Surplus Welfare
e-e 13
18 a¯
2 = 0.722a¯2 1736 a¯
2 = 0.4722a¯2 4336 a¯
2 = 1.1944a¯2
d-e
71
100 a¯
2 + aˆ(1−ρ)4 =
0.71a¯2 + 0.25aˆ (1− ρ)
99
200 a¯
2 + aˆ(1−ρ)8 =
0.495a¯2 + 0.125aˆ (1− ρ)
241
200 a¯
2 + 3aˆ(1−ρ)8 =
1.205a¯2 + 0.375aˆ (1− ρ)
d-d
2625
3698 a¯
2 + 8aˆ(1−ρ)25 =
0.7098a¯2 + 0.32aˆ (1− ρ)
3825
7396 a¯
2 + 6aˆ(1−ρ)25 =
0.517a¯2 + 0.24aˆ (1− ρ)
9075
7396 a¯
2 + 14aˆ(1−ρ)25 =
1.227a¯2 + 0.56aˆ (1− ρ)
a¯- mean of the intercept distribution, aˆ- variance of the intercept distribution.
Table 4. Consumer Surplus, Industry Profits and Welfare
The unambiguous ranking of consumer surpluses reflects the essence of the risk-pooling and strate-
gic premiums. Risk-pooling, by definition, enables better matching of supply and demand, and
thus is beneficial to consumers. This is most clearly illustrated under monopoly, wherein delayed
differentiation is known to enhance both consumer surplus and welfare (cf. Chod and Rudi (2005)).
On the other hand, the strategic premium is an artifact of competitive dynamics, and focused on
the division of the spoils among the competing firms. So it does not contribute to (and perhaps even
detracts from) the consumer surplus. Hence the rank ordering of the consumer surpluses follows
that of the industry-wide risk-pooling premiums. The welfare ranking is also identical because the
benefit to consumers from risk-pooling (when one or both firms follow d) dominates the profit gains
to the competing firms from e (via the strategic premium). Thus, from the perspective of a social
planner intent on maximizing consumer surplus and/or welfare, delayed differentiation outperforms
early differentiation under both monopoly and competition.
5. Endogenizing the choice of Supply Chain Configuration
Our model setting was a three-stage game where firms choose their supply chain configurations in the
first stage, determine production quantities in the second stage, and allocate their production to the
individual markets in the third and final stage (recall Figure 2). In the previous section, we analyzed
the last two stages of this game. We now derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium10 of the entire
10Sub-game perfection is the refinement of the basic Nash equilibrium concept for dynamic games. All sub-game
perfect equilibria are also Nash equilibria, but the converse is not true. A dominant strategy equilibrium is of course
even stronger than Nash, and a rare occurrence in models (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
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game, treating each firm’s choice of supply chain configuration (early or delayed differentiation)
as a strategic decision variable. We assume that firms simultaneously choose their supply chain
configurations.11 Theorem 5.1 below, which derives the best response functions for each firm, is the
essential building block for the rest of this Section.
Theorem 5.1. Best Responses: A firm’s Best Response strategy (BR) to its competitor’s supply
chain configuration is as given below
(1) BR (x) =

d if ρ < ρ2 or
if x = e and ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1)
e if ρ ≥ ρ1 or
if x = d and ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1)
where x ∈ {e,d} is the competitor’s supply chain configuration. Here, ρ1 = max
{
−1, 1− 19
(15γ)2
}
≥
ρ2 = max
{
−1, 1− 697
(86γ)2
}
and γ =
√
aˆ
a¯ is the coefficient of variation.
Theorem 5.1 derives from the profit comparisons of Table 3. Note that the threshold values ρ1 and
ρ2 for the coefficient of correlation, given in Theorem 5.1, are increasing functions of the coefficient of
variation, γ
(
=
√
aˆ
a¯
)
. Thus, early differentiation is the dominating strategy for low γ (i.e., relatively
low aˆ and high a¯) and/or high ρ. As Table 2 showed, this corresponds precisely to the case where the
strategic premium (which is an increasing function of a¯; recall Table 2) dominates the risk pooling
premium (which is increasing in aˆ and decreasing in ρ). Under the reverse conditions, the risk
pooling premium dominates the strategic premium, and d is the dominant strategy. As was shown
in Table 2, when a firm employs d, the risk pooling premium is higher but the strategic premium is
lower when the competitor employs e rather than d. This trade-off drives the best-response function
in the intermediate range (ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1)): here, BR(d) = e and BR(e) = d.
To summarize, Theorem 5.1 demonstrates that early differentiation is the dominant strategy, vis-a`-
vis delayed differentiation, whenever the strategic effects play a prominent role relative to risk pooling
as a driver of profits (ρ ≥ ρ1). The extant Operations literature on postponement, by focusing on
the monopoly analysis, effectively drove the strategic premium to zero, leading to the dominance of
delayed differentiation strategies through the risk pooling premium. The next Theorem characterizes
the equilibrium supply chain configuration choices.
11The sequential game, in which one firm chooses its supply chain configuration first, followed by the other firm’s
response, is discussed later.
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Figure 4. Equilibrium Supply Chain Configurations
Theorem 5.2. Equilibrium Characterization: The unique dominant strategy equilibrium is
(d− d), when ρ < ρ2 and (e− e) when ρ ≥ ρ1. For ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1), the pure strategy sub-game perfect
equilibrium is (d− e) (or equivalently (e− d)).
The derivation is straight-forward from the best-response mappings of Theorem 5.1. In the range
of parameters for which a firm’s best response is d (or e) irrespective of the other firm’s choice, d-d
(or, e-e) is not just a sub-game perfect equilibrium, but in fact the dominant strategy equilibrium.
In the range where the firm’s best response is d for e and e for d, (d− e) (or (e− d)) is an
equilibrium.12 Figure 4 shows the equilibrium supply chain configurations for different values of
the coefficient of correlation and the coefficient of variation. We see that for a very large range of
parameter values, either d-d or e-e are the equilibria. For a narrow sliver of intermediate values
of γ and ρ, the equilibrium is asymmetric (d− e). In this range (ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1)), the game in supply
chain choices is isomorphic to the well-known ‘battle of the sexes’ game, where ‘coordinated’ moves
are an equilibrium. Interestingly, for ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ0), both firms are better off under d-d than under
e-e (see the profit comparisons in Table 3). However, early differentiation is the dominant strategy
12This is similar to the mixed-market equilibrium in Goyal and Netessine (2003) under a different market structure.
Section 7.2 revisits our analysis under a market structure akin to theirs.
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for each firm individually, and so there is no way for either firm to credibly commit to d. Hence
firms do not cooperate and end up in the Pareto-dominated outcome e-e. This case is isomorphic
to the traditional ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ problem.
Sequential Game: The analysis of the sequential game, in which one firm chooses its supply chain
configuration first, followed by the other firm’s response, is straight-forward from the preceding
results. Dominant strategy equilibria are invariant to the timing of moves, and so, d-d (or e-e) is
the equilibrium in the sequential game for the same range of parameter values as in the simultaneous
game (as given by Theorem 5.2). The one twist with respect to the simultaneous game is that in
the range ρ2 ≤ ρ < ρ1 the first-mover computes that Πe|d > Πd|e, and so it always picks e as its
supply chain configuration. The follower-firm then chooses d as its best response.
Entry Deterrence: We conclude this Section by comparing the effectiveness of the two supply chain
configurations (e and d) for an incumbent firm seeking to deter entry in one of its markets. Consider
the case of a firm being a monopoly in two (related) markets. It may chose to serve the two markets
by employing early or delayed differentiation. Suppose that the firm faces a potential entrant in one
of the two markets. The entrant trades off the various entry costs (Capital and Labor investments
in infrastructure) with its potential profits, in making its entry decision. Of course, the incumbent
prefers to deter competition and retain its monopoly power in both its markets.
Theorem 5.3. Entry Deterrence and choice of Supply Chain Configuration: For an in-
cumbent facing a potential entrant in one of its markets, early differentiation is a better entry
deterrence strategy than delayed differentiation.13
6. Heterogeneous Markets
The model of Sections 3-5 assumed that the ex-ante distributions of the monopoly and competitive
markets were identical. This eliminated confounding market-size effects and reduced the number of
demand parameters, leading to sharp intuitions and insights. In this Section, we extend the model
and analysis to non-identical distributions of market demands. While this leads to more complex
expressions for equilibrium solutions and profits, involving many more model parameters, the virtues
13The result applies when the entrant is a ‘new’ firm, or at least one that is not operating currently in any related
product/market. This implies that the entrant is an early differentiator in the proposed market of entry. In the specific
case where (i) the entrant currently operates in related products/markets; and (ii) it threatens to employ delayed
differentiation across its existing markets and the market of potential entry, early differentiation is the preferred
strategy for entry deterrence if and only if ρ > ρ4– a result that follows straight-forwardly from Table 3.
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Setting (i|j) E
[
qM.|.
]
E
[
qC.|.
]
Expected Profits
d|e 1
2 a¯mi
3
10 a¯c
9
100 a¯c
2 + 14 a¯
2
mi +
1
8V ar (ac − ami)
e|e 1
2 a¯mi
1
3 a¯c
1
9 a¯
2
c +
1
4 a¯
2
mi
d|d 1
43 a¯c +
1
2 a¯mi
15
43 a¯c
194
1849 a¯c
2 + 14 a¯
2
mi +
2
225V ar (3ac − 4ami + amj)
e|d 1
2 a¯mi
2
5 a¯c
3
25 a¯
2
c +
1
4 a¯
2
mi
Table 5. Heterogeneous Markets: Expected Sales and Profits under different sup-
ply chain configurations for firm i, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} ; i 6= j.
of this approach are that it allows us to study (i) the impact of varying the relative market sizes
and risk-profiles of the monopoly and competitive markets on the equilibrium; (ii) the effects of
retailer heterogeneity on the choice of supply chain configurations; and (iii) the robustness of the
previous results (e.g., e being a dominant strategy for firms) to relaxing the symmetry assumption.
As in Section 3, we consider two firms, each with their own monopoly (captive) market, which
compete in a common competitive market. The monopoly markets are characterized by the linear
downward-sloping inverse demand curves pmi (q) = ami − q; i ∈ {1, 2}. The competitive market is,
similarly, characterized by the inverse demand curve pc (q) = ac − q. Further, each intercept a. is
random and drawn from a distribution with mean a¯. and variance aˆ.. We denote the correlation
between each monopoly market and the competitive market by ρi, i ∈ {1, 2}, and the correlation
between the two monopoly markets by ρm. To ensure that the joint distribution of the random
variables corresponding to the intercepts is well-defined, we assume that the variance-covariance
matrix of the random vector [am1, ac, am2]T is non-negative definite.14
6.1. Equilibrium. Table 5 shows the expected quantities sold in each market and the profits in
equilibrium under the different supply chain configurations. The expected quantities sold in the
monopoly and competitive markets are identical to the expressions before, albeit with the appro-
priate mean demand intercepts. For the d-d supply chain configuration, the quantities sold in
the monopoly market can now be clearly parsed into two components- the quantity ‘planned’ for
the monopoly market and the spillover from the competitive market, consistent with our earlier
14In addition, to avoid the trivial case of either firm exiting a market completely, we need (probabilistic) bounds
on the spread of these random variables. Sufficient technical conditions are: Pr
 |ac − ami| ≤ a¯mi + 15 a¯c

= 1 and
Pr
 − 96
43
a¯c − 4a¯mi + a¯mj ≤ (3ac − 4ami + amj) ≤ 14443 a¯c + 72 a¯mi + a¯mj

= 1, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} ; i 6= j.
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intuition from the symmetric model (Recall the discussion of the d-d supply chain configuration
following Theorem 4.1, in Section 4.1).
It is easy to check that the sales (and production) quantities derived in Table 5 are related as in
Theorem 4.1. The equilibrium profits can, once again, be parsed into the strategic and risk-pooling
components– the latter a function of demand variances and covariances. While only delayed differen-
tiating firms earn the risk-pooling premium, the strategic premium is higher for early differentiating
firms. This trade-off drives the profit comparisons, firms’ best responses and the ensuing equilibria,
derived below.
Theorem 6.1. (1) Best Responses: A firm’s best response strategy to its competitor’s supply
chain configuration is as given below
BRi (e) =
 e if Ci ≤
38
225
d otherwise
BRi (d) =
 e if Di ≤
6273
3698
d otherwise
where Ci =
V ar(ac−ami)
a¯2c
and Di =
V ar(3ac−4ami+amj)
a¯2c
; i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j .
(2) The equilibrium choice of supply chain configurations is given in Table 6.
6.2. Comparative statics on demand parameters. The impact of changing parameters on
firms’ best responses, given in Table 7, is driven by their impact on the strategic and risk pooling
premiums, since the choice of e or d is, in effect, a trade-off between the two.
Factors that affect the strategic premiums only: Recall that the strategic premium is the benefit from
strategic commitment to the competitive market, which is determined by the size of this market.
Thus a unilateral increase in the mean demand of this market (a¯c) favors e, while an increase in the
size of either monopoly market (a¯mi or a¯mj) has no impact on supply chain strategy– the profits
under e and d obviously change but their relative ordering does not [First two columns of Table 7].
Thus, the degree of competition (the relative size of the competitive and monopolistic markets) is an
important determinant of the optimal supply chain configuration.
Factors that affect the risk-pooling premiums only: The risk-pooling premiums, on the other hand,
arise from the efficient allocation of available goods to the different markets to mitigate the effects
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i-j
Di, Dj <
6273
3698
[BR.(d) = e]
Di <
6273
3698 ≤ Dj
[BRi (d) = e
BRj (d) = d]
Di, Dj ≥ 62733698
[BR. (d) = d]
Ci, Cj ≥ 38225
[BR. (e) = d]
d− e, e− d e− d
d− d
(Dominant
Strategy Eq.)
Ci ≥ 38225 > Cj
[BRi (e) = d
BRj (e) = e]
d− e Infeasible d− d
Ci, Cj <
38
225
[BR. (e) = e]
e− e
(Dominant
Strategy Eq.)
e− e d− d  e− e†
Ci =
V ar(ac−ami)
a¯c2
; Di =
V ar(3ac−4ami+amj)
a¯2c
; i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j. Bold typeface indicates a
dominant strategy. † - Nash Equilibrium d-d Pareto-dominates Nash Equilibrium e-e.
Table 6. Heterogeneous Markets: Equilibrium choice of supply chain configurations
(i-j).
Increasing
Mean De-
mand
Increasing Variance
of Demand
Decreasing
Correla-
tions
Increasing Market Sizes
a¯c ↑
(1)
a¯mi ↑
(2)
aˆc ↑
(3)
aˆmi ↑
(4)
ρi ↓
(5)
ρm ↓
(6)
a¯c, aˆc ↑;
γc constant
(7)
a¯mi, aˆmi ↑;
γmi constant
(8)
BRi (e) → e 0 → d
iff Ti > 0
→ d
iff Mi > 0
→ d 0 → eiff Pi < 0
→ e
iff Mi < 0
BRj (e) → e 0 → diff Tj > 0 0 0 0
→ e
iff Pj < 0 0
BRi (d) → e 0 → d
iff Ui > 0
→ d
iff Ni > 0
→ d → d → eiff Ri < 0
→ e
iff Ni < 0
BRj (d) → e 0 → diff Uj > 0
→ d
iff Oi > 0
→ e → d → eiff Rj < 0
→ e
iff Oi < 0
γc = aˆc/ a¯
2
c, γmi = aˆmi/ a¯
2
mi, Ti = 1− ρi
p
aˆmi/ aˆc, Ui = 3− 4ρi
p
aˆmi/ aˆc + ρj
p
aˆmj/ aˆc, Mi = 1− ρi
p
aˆc/ aˆmi,
Ni = 4− ρm
p
aˆmj/ aˆmi − 3ρi
p
aˆc/ aˆmi, Oi = 1− 4ρm
p
aˆmj/ aˆmi + 3ρi
p
aˆc/ aˆmi, Pi = 1− 38225γc − ρi
p
aˆmi/ aˆc,
Ri = 3− 4ρi
p
aˆmi/ aˆc + ρj
p
aˆmj/ aˆc − 20913698γc .
Table 7. Effect of altering demand parameters on Best Response choices, for i, j ∈
{1, 2} ; i 6= j. Each column illustrates the effect of increasing (denoted by the symbol
‘↑’) or decreasing (denoted by ‘↓’) the value of a parameter. The symbol ‘→ e [d]’
denotes an increasing tendency to adopt early [delayed] differentiation.
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of demand uncertainty. Hence these are functions of the variance of the demand in the individual
markets (aˆc, aˆmi and aˆmj) and demand correlations (ρi, ρj and ρm). Since the risk-pooling pre-
miums are functions of the random variables ami, ac, and amj , the net effect of a change in any
one of aˆc, aˆmi or aˆmj depends on their interactions. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 completely
characterize the effect of a marginal change in the variance of demand of any individual market.
The impact of a change in demand correlations (ρi, ρj and ρm) is unambiguous [columns (5) and
(6) of Table 7]. A decrease in the correlation ρi between firm i ’s monopoly and competitive markets
increases the risk pooling premium and favors delayed differentiation for firm i, irrespective of firm
j ’s supply chain configuration [First and third rows of Column (5)]. If firm i employs e, its two
markets are decoupled, and so, a change in ρi has no impact on firm j ’s choice [Second row of
Column (5)]. On the other hand, if firm i employs d, firm j is more likely to employ e, which yields
a higher strategic premium [Fourth row of Column (5)].
Finally, the two monopoly markets are decoupled when either firm employs e. Hence ρm, the
correlation between the two monopoly markets, affects only the best responses to d. A lower ρm
favors d, on account of better ability of firms to pool risks and match supply and demand in the
markets [Column (6) of Table 7].
Other factors: It should be clear from the preceding that a change in the market size (wherein
the mean a¯. and the variance aˆ. of a market move simultaneously, while keeping the coefficient of
variation γ. constant) will affect both risk-pooling and strategic premiums. The net impact depends
on their relative magnitudes, and is completely characterized in Table 7 [Columns (7) and (8)].
Finally, it should be noted that the directional impact of changing a parameter on the equilibrium
is easily derived from its impact on each firm’s best response, characterized in Table 7.
6.3. Identical Retailers. The trade-offs between the risk-pooling and strategic premiums can be
clearly illustrated in the case of identical retailers, obtained by setting a¯mi = a¯mj = a¯m, aˆmi = aˆmj =
aˆm and ρi = ρj = ρ in the above model (Note that the demand distributions in the monopoly and
competitive markets are distinct, and further, ρm need not be equal to ρ). This symmetry renders
the middle row and column of Table 6 infeasible; however, any of the equilibria characterized by
the remaining four cells of Table 6 can arise with appropriately chosen parameters.15
15 We require that ρ2 ≤ 1+ρm
2
. This condition guarantees positive Eigen vectors (equivalent to non-negative definite-
ness) for the variance-covariance matrix.
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Figure 5. Identical Retailers: Best Response Mappings & Equilibria
This is succinctly illustrated in Figure 5. As discussed above, the risk-pooling premium increases
unambiguously as ρ or ρm decrease. When both ρ and ρm are small, the risk-pooling premium is
maximized, and d-d is the dominant strategy equilibrium (Region II of Figure 5). Conversely, when
ρ and ρm are large enough, the strategic premium outweighs the risk-pooling premium, leading to
e-e as the dominant strategy equilibrium (Region III of Figure 5). In the remaining regions, neither
early nor delayed differentiation are dominant strategies.
7. Model Extensions
In Section 6, we generalized the demand assumptions of Section 3, allowing for heterogeneous
retailers and market-sizes, and found that our results were robust to these relaxations. In this
penultimate Section, we study the implications of two other assumptions inherent in the main
model by relaxing the model appropriately.
The first assumption we study is that of clearance. Section 7.1 relaxes the clearance assumption and
develops a model allowing both firms to hold back some or all of their inventory in the distribution
stage of the game. Second, in Section 7.2 we analyze an alternate market structure– that of two
firms competing in two correlated markets. In this alternate structure, the two firms compete in
two markets and unlike the main model neither firm has recourse to a captive (monopoly) market.
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7.1. Holdback Strategies.
7.1.1. Why assume Clearance? As noted in Section 3, the main model of the paper (Sections 4
and 5) assumed that firms follow a clearance strategy in the distribution of their products. Thus,
firms allocate all of their available goods to the markets, with the appropriate adjustments in price.
Analytical tractability was the primary consideration for this assumption– academic precedents
show that the clearance assumption is sometimes necessary even in a monopoly setting.16 Chod
and Rudi (2005) show that their qualitative results under monopoly are robust to relaxations of the
clearance assumption. Further, firms are often less flexible in their production commitments than
in their prices– necessitating price-adjustments to clear their stock (cf. Mackintosh (2003)).
Allowing holdback in a model of competition is fraught with additional complexities. The option of
salvaging affects firms’ effective marginal-revenue curves, and hence affects production and distri-
bution decisions for the firms. Further, the assumption of linear salvaging costs, ubiquitous in the
extant literature, introduces points of non-differentiability in the reaction curves. A firm’s salvaging
decision is in turn a function of the realized demand in both its markets (monopoly and competitive),
available quantities, and the competitor’s shipment decisions. Thus, salvaging is state-dependent–
firms may salvage under certain demand outcomes and not under others. These complex interac-
tions of firms’ reaction curves under salvaging render the analysis of optimal policies doubly (or
triply) hard under competition. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the clearance assump-
tion, by enhancing the credibility of quantity-commitment to the competitive market (and raising
the strategic premium) particularly under e, unduly biases our results in favor of early differen-
tiation. If so, the addition of a salvage market would dilute the credibility of commitment (and
hence, the strategic premium) for both early and delayed differentiation, with the greater adverse
impact on early differentiation. This motivates our study of optimal supply chain configurations
under holdback, with the demand model of Section 3 simplified as below.
7.1.2. Model allowing Holdback. We assume that the demand intercept in the competitive market
is a binary random variable that may take one of two values- ah with probability p or al with
probability (1− p), where 0 < p < 1. The demand intercept in the monopoly markets takes a
16See page 7 (Section 3).
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constant (and known) value of a. We relax the clearance assumption: Firms may sell some of their
production quantities in the markets and salvage the rest at a unit cost s, where s > 0.17.
Now, firms must make their salvaging choice for two possible states of nature- high or low demand
in the competitive market. We will focus on the case of firms salvaging only when the demand is
low.18
7.1.3. Analysis. Table 8 lists the quantities produced, sold and salvaged in equilibrium under the
different combinations of supply chain configurations.19 Recall the conjecture that motivated this
Section, viz., that the clearance assumption in the analysis of Sections 4 and 5 biased our results in
favor of e by inflating the strategic premium excessively for e compared to d. If this were true, the
addition of the salvage market should reduce the strategic premium for e more than for d. In fact, a
comparison of salvage quantities (from Table 8) appears to lend support to this conjecture. We find
that (i) under the e-d (or d-e) configuration, the e firm salvages more than d
(
qse|d > q
s
d|e
)
; and (ii)
fixing the competitor’s choice of supply chain configuration (at e or d), a firm always salvages more
in equilibrium if it adopts e rather than d (mathematically, qse|e > q
s
d|e and q
s
e|d > q
s
d|d). Excessive
salvaging under e points to a disproportionate weakening of its ability to commit to the competitive
market (compared to d).
However, when firms’ choices of supply chain configurations are endogenized, we find that both
d and e can arise as dominant strategies, leading to d-d and e-e as dominant strategy equilibria.
Thus, allowing holdback does not preclude e from being a dominant strategy. Figure 6 graphically
illustrates our closed-form results. The feasible range of values for al is (0, 0.9ah), as noted in
footnote 19. Thus, the area below the curve al = 0 is relevant for our analysis. Two features of
Figure 6 are especially striking and, at first glance, counter-intuitive. The first is the wide range
17Salvaging costs must be greater than production costs (which were normalized to 0), else firms may produce solely
to salvage, generating infinite profits. Equivalently, the salvage value is −s.
18The case when firms never choose to salvage reduces to our earlier analysis with the clearance assumption. A little
thought reveals that the remaining salvaging strategies are suboptimal and hence eliminated. If a firm salvaged under
both states of nature (i.e., irrespective of the demand realization), it would always earn a marginal revenue of −s.
This cannot be optimal, since the firm can strictly improve profits by marginally decreasing production and salvage
quantities equally. Finally, consider the case of a firm salvaging only under high demand and not under low demand.
This implies that the firm earns a marginal revenue of -s under high demand (through salvaging), but, with the same
production quantity, reaps a higher marginal revenue under low demand (since that is when it would choose not to
salvage) – a contradiction.
19To ensure that firms choose to salvage in the low demand state, the salvage cost needs to be small enough (to
make salvaging worthwhile), and both the demand spread and the probability of high demand in the competitive
market need to be large enough (so that the production quantity (which is determined ex ante) is large, leading to
salvaging under low demand). The precise sufficient technical condition under which the results of Table 8 hold is
that s

1 + 24
p

< 9ah − 10al.
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Setting Low Demand High Demand Quantities Produced
qC.|. q
M
.|. q
s
.|. q
C
.|. q
M
.|.
e|e al+s3
a
2
ahp−alp−s
3p
(ahp−(1−p)s)
3p
a
2
ah+s
3 − s3p ; a2
d|e al+s3
a+s
2
9ahp−10alp−(24+p)s
30p
3(ahp−(1−p)s)
10p
a
2 − (1−p)s2p 5a+3ah10 − 8s(1−p)10p
e|d al+s3
a
2
6ahp−5alp−(6−p)s
15p
2(ahp−(1−p)s)
5p
a
2
2(ahp−(1−p)s)
5p ;
a
2
d|d al+s3
a+s
2
96ahp−86alp−5(45−2p)s
258p
15(ahp−(1−p)s)
43p
a
2 +
2ap−45(1−p)s
86p
a
2 +
32ahp−75s(1−p)
86p
Table 8. Quantities Produced, Sold and Salvaged in Equilibrium, under Hold-
back. qC and qM are the quantities sold in the Competitive and Monopoly markets
respectively; qs denotes the quantity salvaged.
of values for which e-e is the dominant strategy, even under holdback. For instance, in the entire
range al ≥ 0.5ah, e-e is the unique (dominant strategy) equilibrium for all feasible values of s and
p– delayed differentiation is always suboptimal for firms, irrespective of the competitor’s choice. A
second notable feature is that, holding other model parameters constant, e-e is more likely to be
the equilibrium when the salvage cost s decreases (equivalently, when the salvage value increases),
i.e., when holdback is favored.
These results are explained as follows. While the additional salvage market disproportionately
reduces the strategic premium for e compared to d, it also facilitates greater risk-pooling under
both d and e– with a disproportionately favorable impact on e. Both these observations (on the
relative impact of the strategic and risk-pooling premiums on d and e) stem from the greater
marginal impact of a second market (on e) than that of a third market (on d). The net impact of
allowing holdback (via salvaging) on the risk-pooling premium evidently trumps its effect on the
strategic premium, leading to the above results. Thus, our central result – that early differentiation
is a dominant strategy under broadly plausible conditions – is robust to allowing holdback (i.e.,
relaxing the clearance assumption).
7.2. An Alternative Market Structure– Two Competitive Markets. In this Section, we
consider an alternative market structure– that of two firms competing in two (possibly correlated)
markets, as in Goyal and Netessine (2003) and others. Markets i and j have intercepts ai and aj ,
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Figure 6. Equilibrium Choice of Supply Chain Configurations as a function of s,
al and p under holdback. The feasible range of values for al is (0, 0.9ah). In the
figure, ah is normalized to 1 . For each iso-curve al = k, the corresponding feasible
range of parameter values is the region below the iso-curve.
Figure 7. Alternate Market Structure: Two Competitive Markets
drawn from distributions with mean a¯i and a¯j respectively (Figure 7). We assume that firms employ
a clearance strategy.
Table 9 summarizes the results of our analysis of the expected sales, production and profits under
the different supply chain configurations. As before, the e-e configuration leads to the standard
Cournot outcome. Further, only a d firm earns the risk-pooling premium, which is higher when
the competing firm is unable to pool risks (i.e., employs e). In the d-d supply chain configuration,
both firms can opportunistically reallocate their production to the market with higher demand.
This flexibility earns each of them an additional risk-pooling premium leading to higher profits than
under e-e. We find that d-d Pareto-dominates e-e.
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Setting Expected Sales in
market i, E
[
qi.|.
] Total
Production
Strategic Premium Risk Pooling
Premium
e|e a¯i3
a¯i+a¯j
3 Πcc 0
d|e 7a¯i+a¯j24
a¯i+a¯j
3 Πcc −
7(a¯i−a¯j)2
288
V ar(ai−aj)
8
e|d 5a¯i−a¯j12
a¯i+a¯j
3 Πcc +
(a¯i−a¯j)2
144 0
d|d a¯i3
a¯i+a¯j
3 Πcc
V ar(ai−aj)
18
Table 9. Alternate Market Structure: Expected Sales, Production and Profits un-
der each supply chain configuration. Πcc ,
a¯2i+a¯
2
j
9 , denotes a firm’s profits under
Cournot competition in both markets.
The two-competitive-markets structure leads to an interesting twist with regard to the strategic
premium under the d-e supply chain configuration. The e firm cannot compel the competing d
firm to divert its production into an alternative monopoly market– no such alternatives exist. In
fact, as Table 9 shows, under every possible supply chain configuration, each firm’s total production
is identical (and equal to a¯i+a¯j3 , the outcome under Cournot competition). However, when the
market sizes are asymmetric (a¯i 6= a¯j), the e firm gains a competitive advantage over the d firm by
simultaneously committing greater-than-Cournot quantities to the larger market and lesser-than-
Cournot quantities to the smaller market. This combination of actions induces the d firm to divert
production from the larger to the smaller market (with lower prices and smaller profits). As a result,
in the d-e configuration, the e firm gains a significant strategic premium over d. The equilibria,
derived in Theorem 7.1 below, are determined by the relative magnitudes of the risk-pooling and
strategic premiums.
Theorem 7.1. Analysis of equilibria for two competitive markets
(i) When (a¯i − a¯j)2 > 8 · V ar (ai − aj) , e-e is the (unique) dominant strategy equilibrium, even
though e-e is Pareto-dominated by d-d.
(ii) When (a¯i − a¯j)2 < 367 · V ar (ai − aj) , d-d is the dominant strategy equilibrium.
(iii) In the intermediate region 367 · V ar (ai − aj) ≤ (a¯i − a¯j)2 ≤ 8 · V ar (ai − aj), both e-e and d-d
are pure-strategy Nash equilibria, but d-d Pareto-dominates e-e.
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Figure 8. Alternate Market Structure: Equilibrium Choice of Supply Chain Con-
figuration. Bold typeface indicates a dominant strategy. †−Nash equilibria d-d
Pareto dominates Nash equilibria e-e
Figure 8 illustrates these results. Yet again, for a substantial range of parameter values, early
differentiation is the dominant strategy due to the strategic premium. In this range, firms settle for
the Pareto-dominated e-e, as in the classical ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.
These results parallel those in Goyal and Netessine (2003)’s model of production technology choices.
Our risk pooling premium corresponds to their ‘stochastic effect’; our strategic premium to their
‘market size effect’. In their model, the tension between the difference in mean market sizes and
demand variances drives firms’ choices in equilibrium, which parallels Theorem 7.1 above.
8. Concluding Remarks
In this study, we identified endogenous strategic effects that significantly diminish the value of
delayed differentiation under competition. We isolated these strategic effects from the conventional
risk pooling benefits, and identified conditions under which the strategic effects dominate the risk
pooling benefits from postponement. Under these conditions, our results depart significantly from
those of the extant literature: delayed differentiation is not the preferred supply chain configuration
to manage the effects of demand uncertainty under competition.
The strategic weakness of delayed differentiation arises from the inability to make market-specific
quantity commitments. Early differentiating competitors can exploit this to their advantage. When
both firms deploy delayed differentiation, the lack of commitment leads to both firms oversupplying
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the markets to preempt aggression by the other. Moreover, markets served by delayed differentiating
firms are attractive targets for entry.
From the perspective of a social planner intent on maximizing consumer surplus and/or wel-
fare, delayed differentiation is always preferable to early differentiation under both monopoly and
competition– a result reflecting the essential difference between the risk-pooling and strategic pre-
miums. Risk-pooling, by definition, enables better matching of supply and demand, and thus is
beneficial to consumers. On the other hand, the strategic premium is an artifact of competitive
dynamics, and focused on the division of the spoils among the competing firms. In fact, the rank
ordering of the consumer surpluses from the various supply chain configurations follows that of the
industry-wide risk-pooling premiums– highest when both firms employ delayed differentiation and
lowest when both employ early differentiation.
We extended the main model to analyze the cases of asymmetric markets, inventory holdback,
and an alternate market structure, with the firms competing in two markets. We proved that in all
these cases, early differentiation is the dominant strategy equilibrium for a broad range of parameter
values (even under cost parity with delayed differentiation).
A central message of this paper is the importance of the link between a firm’s Operations (supply
chain design) and its competitive environment (industry structure). Researchers in Operations
need to test the robustness of their prescriptions to varying industry structures. A cross-sectional,
empirical study of the link between a firm’s choice of supply chain configuration and prices, market
concentration and the threat of competitive entry would be of interest for future research.
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